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Recent research have found that the separation of the control right and the cash 
flow right makes the ultimate controlling shareholders have not only the power, but 
also the motivation to expropriate the minority shareholders. The larger the 
divergence, the bigger the likelihood of expropriation is. This relationship has been 
significantly proved under the Asian financial crisis. However, Friedman et al. (2003) 
and Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) have recently found that ultimate controlling 
shareholders will prop up their companies when they went into financial distress, 
which will also benefit the minority shareholders. 
Will the corporate be subject to tunneling or be propped up by ultimate controlling 
shareholders under financial crisis? What’s the reaction by the market valuation? This 
paper is trying to answer them. 
In this paper, we have chosen March 2008-December 2009 as the period under 
financial crisis, and May 2006-Febrary 2008 as the pre-crisis period. By tracing the 
ultimate controlling shareholders from the control chains, we try to investigate the 
relationship between the excess control and the corporate valuation. The results are as 
follows: 
Under financial crisis, the nonmonotonicity in the relationship of the excess control 
right of the ultimate controlling shareholders and the corporate valuation is confirmed. 
When the wedge between the control right and the cash flow right is small, the value 
of the corporate has been protected because of being propped up. But when the wedge 
becomes larger and larger, the corporate valuation decreases significantly. However, 
the latter is not true when it comes to the state ultimate controlling shareholder. 
Comparing to the pre-crisis period, the relationship has significantly changed. 
Generally speaking, once the excess control right occurs, the corporate valuation must 
been significantly discounted. However, under financial crisis this excess control right 















experiencing worse stock performance since the minority shareholders expect the 
corporate will be propped up when it gets into troubles. It is the same to the 
companies under state control. 
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Bebchuk et al. (2002)[5]的研究表明终极控制权与现金流权的分离使得终极控
制人掩盖了其对少数股东的利益侵占行为。Claessens et al. (2002)[6]研究发现，终
极控制人所持有的现金流权与公司价值成正方向关系，而终极控制人的控制权与
现金流权的偏离度越大，则公司价值越低。Lins(2003)[7]的相关实证研究也证明
















































                                                        
② Baek 等(2004)的研究只针对韩国。 








































法 早由Grossman和Hart(1986)[19]提出，而Claessens et al. (2000)[3]直接将所有权




















在现金流权的计算方面，本文使用与 La Porta et al. (1999) [2]和 Claessens et al. 
(2000)[3]一致的计量方法，即现金流权等于各条控制链上持股比例累计相乘之积













票权（Voting Right）作为控制权的替代变量。Claessens et al. (2000)[3]直接把控制
权定义为投票权。本文仍采用La Porta et al. (1999)[2]和Claessens et al. (2000)[3]的
计算方法，即控制权比例等于各控制链上 低的持股比例之和。仍沿用图 1.1 的
例子进行说明：A公司对于C公司的控制权为：20%+20%=40%。 
1.2.3 终极控制人的界定 
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